73 research outputs found
Austrian Philosophy and its Institutions: Remarks on the Philosophical Society of the University of Vienna (1888-1938)
This study examines the place of the Philosophical Society of the University of
Vienna (1888-1938) in the evolution of the history of philosophy in Austria up to the
establishment of the Vienna Circle in 1929. I will examine three aspects of the relationship
between the Austrian members of the Vienna Circle and the Philosophical Society which has been emphasized by several historians of the Vienna Circle: the first aspect concerns the theory of a first Vienna Circle formed mainly by H. Hahn, P. Frank and O. Neurath; the second aspect is the contention that the missing link between the Vienna Circle and the Bolzano tradition in Austria is Alois Höfler, a student of Brentano and Meinong; I will finally examine the link they established between the annexation of the Philosophical Society to the Kant-Gesellschaft in 1927 and the founding of the Vienna Circle in 1929. I will argue that this institution played a key role in the history of philosophy in Austria and is partly responsible for the formation of the Vienna Circle
Franz Brentano in Vienna
This paper is the general introduction to a collection of essays entitled Franz Brentano and Austrian Philosophy (forthcoming). In this substantial introduction, I comment several aspects of the recent reception of Brentano’s philosophical programme in contemporary philosophy, and the actual debates on topics such as emotions, values, and intentionality, for example. It is divided in four parts corresponding to the four sections of the book. The first three sections contain 11 original contributions on Brentano’s philosophy and its place in the history of philosophy in Austria, and the last section contains three unpublished manuscripts from Alfred Kastil et Moritz Schlick.
I. Descriptive psychology and phenomenology: Brentano and Husserl
II. Brentano and the Vienna Circle
III. Brentano and the history of philosophy
IV. Documentation: Alfred Kastil and the Vienna Circl
Consciousness and Intentionality in Anton Marty’s Lecture on Descriptive Psychology
Abstract: In this study, I propose to examine Marty’s reconstruction of the general
framework in which Brentano develops his theory of consciousness. My
starting point is the formulation, at the very beginning of the second chapter
of the second book of Brentano’s Psychology, of two theses on mental phenomena,
which constitute the basis of Brentano’s theory of primary and secondary objects.
In the second part, I examine the objection of infinite regress raised
against Brentano’s theory of primary and secondary objects and Marty’s interpretation
of Brentano’s theory of the unity of consciousness. The third part bears on
the important distinction between implicit and explicit consciousness, which
Brentano introduces in his lectures on descriptive psychology. Here, I analyse
Marty’s principle of individuation in light of the modifications which Brentano
made to his theory of consciousness after the publication of his Psychology in
1874. The last section is an examination of Marty’s conception of consciousness
as self-consciousness with respect to his principle of individuation
Mixed Feelings. Carl Stumpf's Criticism of James and Brentano on Emotions
This study attempts to situate Carl Stumpf's theory of emotions with regard to that of his teacher, Franz Brentano, and to the sensualist theory of William James. We will argue that Stumpf's theory can be considered an attempt to reconcile James's sensualism, which emphasizes the role of bodily feelings, with what we will call, for the purposes of this study, Brentano's intentionalism, which conceives of emotions as intentional states. Stumpf claims that James's sensory feelings and Brentano's affective intentional states are two sides of the same coin in that they constitute two essential ingredients of a full-fledged theory of emotions. The question is whether Stumpf's ecumenism avoids the objections that he himself raises against James's and Brentano's theories. The paper is divided into four parts: the first part presents Stumpf's classification of psychical functions; the second part presents his criticism of James's theory of emotions; the third part is a summary of Stumpf's complex debate with Brentano on emotions and sensory feelings; the last part examines Stumpf's attempt to incorporate into his theory of affects the phenomenological and intentional aspects of emotions. I conclude with a note on the unity of consciousness
The reception of Ernst Mach in the school of Brentano
This paper is about the reception of Ernst Mach by Brentano and his
students in Austria. I shall outline the main elements of this reception, starting with
Brentano’s evaluation, in his lectures on positivism, of Mach’s theory of sensations.
Secondly, I shall comment the early reception of Mach by Brentano’s pupils in Prague.
The third part bears on the close relationship that Husserl established between his
phenomenology and Mach’s descriptivism. I will then briefly examine Mach’s contribution
to the controversy on gestalt qualities. The fifth part bears on Stumpf’s debate with Mach
on psychophysical relations and I shall conclude on Husserl’s criticism of Mach’s alleged
logical psychologism
Brentano’s lectures on positivism (1893-1894) and his relationship to Ernst Mach
This paper is mainly about Brentano’s commentaries on Ernst Mach in his
lectures “Contemporary philosophical questions” which he held one year before he left
Austria. I will first identify the main sources of Brentano’s interests in Comte’s and J. S.
Mill’s positivism during his Würzburg period. The second section provides a short overview
of Brentano’s 1893-1894 lectures and his criticism of Comte, Kirchhoff, and Mill. The next
sections bear on Brentano’s criticism of Mach’s monism and Brentano’s argument against
the reduction of the mental based on his theory of intentionality. The last section is about
Brentano’s proposal to replace the identity relation in Mach’s theory of elements by that of
intentional correlation. I conclude with a remark on the history of philosophy in Austria
Emotions and Moods in Husserl’s Phenomenology
In this study, I will first introduce Husserl’s analysis in Studien zur Struktur des Bewußtseins by emphasizing the reasons that motivate these analyses on descriptive psychology and their status in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology in the late Freiburg period. I will then focus on the structure of acts, with particular emphasis on three aspects stressed by Husserl in Studien: intentionality, the taxonomy of acts, and Brentano’s principle of the Vorstellungsgrundlage. The last three parts of this study outline the characteristic features of three fundamental aspects of affective life in Husserl’s phenomenology: emotions, sense feelings, and moods. I will conclude with some general remarks on the status of affects and values in Husserl’s phenomenology
Remarks on the architecture of Brentano’s philosophical program
This paper is about Brentano’s philosophical program in Vienna and the overall
architecture, which binds together the main parts of his philosophy. I argue that this
program is based on Brentano’s project of philosophy as science and it aims to account for
the unity of the main branches of his philosophy. The paper is divided into six parts. The
first bears on Brentano’s philosophy of history, which is an important piece of the program.
The second is on the close relationship between philosophy and science, and the third is on
Brentano’s classification of theoretical sciences. In the three remaining parts of the paper,
I examine the two main axes of the program, i.e. psychology and metaphysics, and the
question how the three normative sciences are rooted in psychology. In the conclusion, I
argue that Brentano’s theory of the four phases in the history of philosophy provides his
philosophical program with a justification
Robert Zimmermann and Herbartianism in Vienna. The critical reception from Brentano and his followers
This study is about an aspect of the reception of Herbatianism in Austria which has not been thoroughly investigated so far. It pertains to a controversy opposing Robert Zimmermann and Franz Brentano in the context of discussions which took place in the Philosophical Society of the University of Vienna. This study looks more specifically at three important episodes involving the Philosophical Society, first, the controversy over Herbartianism, second that over the evaluation of Schelling’s philosophy, and finally the reception of Bolzano in Austria. I will first describe the circumstances that led Zimmermann to get involved in the Philosophical Society and the source of his controversy with Brentano and his followers. I will then comment Zimmermann’s address as chairman of the Philosophical Society and Brentano’s reaction to Zimmermann’s remarks on Schelling and the historical period to which he belongs. I will complete my analysis of Brentano’s reaction with a summary of his evaluation of Herbart’s philosophical program to which Zimmermann adhered. The last part focuses on Zimmermann’s decisive role in the reception of Bolzano in Vienna in connection with the Bolzano Commission established by the Philosophical Society. I will conclude with brief remarks on Zimmermann’s legacy in Vienna
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